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I. INTRODUCTION
James Shaw is presently serving a twenty-five year sentence in a
federal penitentiary.' Convicted of seven counts of carnal knowledge
of his eleven-year-old foster daughter, he is an unlikely candidate for
public or political sympathy. The moral repugnance typically elicited
from sexual crimes--especially when the rape complainant is a
child-however, should not be allowed to mask, in the name of jus-
tice, a serious misapplication of the federal rape-shield law.2
1. United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1033
(1988).
2. Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in
which a person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape,
reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of
such rape or assault is not admissible.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in
which a person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape,
evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior other than reputation or opinion
evidence is also not admissible, unless such evidence other than reputation or
opinion evidence is-
(1) admitted in accordance with subdivisions (c)(l) and (c)(2) and is
constitutionally required to be admitted; or
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of-
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused,
offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not,
with respect to the alleged victim, the source of semen or injury; or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the
accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual
behavior with respect to which rape or assault is alleged.
(c)(l) If the person accused of committing rape or assault with intent to
commit rape intends to offer under subdivision (b) evidence of specific instances
of the alleged victim's past sexual behavior, the accused shall make a written
motion to offer such evidence not later than fifteen days before the date on which
the trial in which such evidence is to be offered is scheduled to begin, except that
the court may allow the motion to be made at a later date, including during trial,
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Federal Rule of Evidence 412, popularly known as the federal
rape-shield law, was the first amendment 3 to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, enacted just three years earlier in 1975.1 The rape-shield law
governs the circumstances and procedures to be followed when either
the defendant or the prosecutor offers evidence of the complainant's
past sexual behavior in a trial for rape or assault with intent to com-
mit rape. Prior to the enactment of this amendment, Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(a)(2) governed the introduction of character evidence
for any crime victim, including victims of rape.5
if the court determines either that the evidence is newly discovered and could not
have been obtained earlier through the exercise of due diligence or that the issue
to which such evidence related has newly arisen in the case. Any motion made
under this paragraph shall be served on all other parties and on the alleged
victim.
(2) The motion described in paragraph (1) shall be accompanied by a
written offer of proof. If the court determines that the offer of proof contains
evidence described in subdivision (b), the court shall order a hearing in chambers
to determine if such evidence is admissible. At such hearing the parties may call
witnesses, including the alleged victim, and offer relevant evidence.
Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of Rule 104, if the relevancy of the evidence
which the accused seeks to offer in the trial depends upon the fulfillment of a
condition of fact, the court at the hearing in chambers or at a subsequent hearing
in chambers scheduled for such purpose, shall accept evidence on the issue of
whether such condition of fact is fulfilled and shall determine such issue.
(3) If the court determines on the basis of the hearing described in
paragraph (2) that the evidence which the accused seeks to offer is relevant and
that the probative value of such evidence outweighs the danger of unfair
prejudice, such evidence shall be admissible in the trial to the extent an order
made by the court specifies evidence which may be offered and areas with respect
to which the alleged victim may be examined or cross-examined.
(d) For purposes of this rule, the term "past sexual behavior" means
sexual behavior other than the sexual behavior with respect to which rape or
assault with intent to commit rape is alleged.
FED. R. EvID. 412 (emphasis added).
3. Pub. L. No. 95-540, 92 Stat. 2046 (1978). This Act resulted in Federal Rule of
Evidence 412, the federal rape-shield law, which became effective in trials commencing after
November 28, 1978.
4. The Federal Rules of Evidence went into effect on July 1, 1975. See Act of Jan. 2,
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
5. Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in relevant part:
(a) Character evidence generally.
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible
for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(2) Character of victim.
Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character
trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to
rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.
FED. R. EVID. 404.
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Under Rule 404(a)(2), it was possible for a defendant accused of
rape to present evidence of the complainant's past sexual behavior for
the inference that, in light of such past behavior, the sexual act in
question was probably consentual and not rape at all.6 Under the new
rape-shield law, complainants are protected from the introduction of
this type of irrelevant evidence at trial. In fact, Rule 412 is written as
an exclusionary rule; therefore, the accused is absolutely prohibited
from introducing evidence of past sexual behavior in the form of repu-
tation or opinion testimony. Although evidence of a complainant's
past sexual behavior, other than reputation or opinion evidence, is not
absolutely prohibited, it must fit within one of the three exceptions
provided in the Rule. The trial judge may allow evidence to be intro-
duced that is constitutionally required,7 evidence offered by the
accused of past sexual behavior between himself and the complainant
on the issue of consent,' or evidence offered by the accused of past
sexual behavior between the complainant and other individuals on the
issue of whether the accused was the source of either semen or injury.9
The specific type of evidence Congress intended to come within the
third exception--commonly known as the "injury" exception-is the
subject of this Note and will be examined in light of United States v.
Shaw. 10
In Shaw, the federal government charged the defendant with a
ten-count indictment: eight counts of carnal knowledge in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 2032,"1 and two counts of interstate trans-
portation for immoral purposes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421.12
After a five-day jury trial in the United States District Court for the
District of South Dakota, the jury convicted the defendant of seven
counts of carnal knowledge under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 2032.,3
In compliance with Rule 412(c)(1), the defendant filed a pretrial
written motion, proffering evidence to rebut the government's evi-
dence regarding the condition of the complainant's hymen. 14 The
6. The advisory committee's note states in part: "[A]n accused may introduce pertinent
evidence of the character of the victim, as in support of a claim of... consent in a case of rape
... "1 FED. R. EvID. 404(a) advisory committee's note, (reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 220
(1973).
7. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1).
8. Id. at 412(b)(2)(B).
9. Id. at 412(b)(2)(A).
10. 824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987).
11. Congress repealed 18 U.S.C. § 2032 in 1986 and replaced it with 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c).
Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 87(b), 100 Stat. 3620 (1986).
12. Shaw, 824 F.2d at 602.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 603.
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motion asserted that seven young boys would testify that they had
sexual intercourse with the complainant, one that he had sexual inter-
course with her fifty times.15 The district court rejected the defend-
ant's motion, ruling as a matter of law that the rupturing of a hymen
does not constitute a Rule 412(b)(2)(A) "injury." 16 The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held, affirmed: The condition of a rape
complainant's hymenal membrane indicating sexual intercourse,
absent some other condition such as a tearing or bruising of the
hymen, falls short of establishing an injury so as to trigger the applica-
bility of Rule 412's injury exception. 17 United States v. Shaw, 824
F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1033 (1988).
In evaluating the issue raised in Shaw, Section II of this Note
first provides the reader with a brief overview of the evolutionary pro-
cess that culminated in the enactment of the federal rape-shield law.
A particularly relevant step in this evolution was the adoption of state
rape-shield legislation and its impact on the federal statute. To this
extent, Section III discusses two approaches taken by state legislators
to rape-shield legislation. In addition, Section III highlights inherent
weaknesses within the statutes by examining the application of these
laws in various state courts. This statutory analysis of state law is an
essential link in understanding how Congress intended Rule 412 to be
interpreted and applied by the federal courts. Section IV then exam-
ines the structure of Rule 412 primarily through an analysis of the
Rule's application in Shaw. This Section first examines the enactment
of Rule 412 and then reviews its passage in relation to the previous
rules governing the introduction of character evidence in federal
court, as well as in relation to the emerging political trend in the
states. Next, pertinent comparisons are drawn between the aforemen-
tioned state statutory approaches and the relevant historical informa-
tion. Finally, Section V concludes that the Eighth Circuit erred in the
first federal case to specify the type of evidence an accused may intro-
duce under the "injury" exception. Specifically, the court's analysis
failed to recognize the very reason that prompted Congress to enact
this special protection for rape complainants-that is, to prohibit the
introduction of irrelevant or prejudicial past sexual behavior evidence
because it relied on common law notions inferring consent or a lack of
credibility. Contrary to the court's interpretation, Congress never
meant to exclude highly relevant evidence not relying on such out-
dated notions.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 605.
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II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The social stigma traditionally attached to rape victims"8 should
soon dissipate into nothing more than an anachronistic belief
grounded in yesteryear's society. To a large extent, credit must be
given to the Women's Movement, which seized upon the "crime of
rape as a powerful metaphor for the sort of oppression many women
found in traditional roles assigned to them in society."' 19 The Move-
ment sought to protect the rape complainant from the common and
prevalent judicial attitude that accorded probative force to the past
sexual behavior of a complaining witness in a prosecution for rape or
related offenses. Defense tactics often resulted in pointless and cruel
foraging into sexual history, thus subjecting the complainant to need-
less, psychological or emotional abuse.2°
The efforts of the Women's Movement have culminated in
nationwide reform of evidentiary laws applicable to rape prosecutions,
commonly referred to as rape-shield laws.21 Such legislation has
obliterated the longstanding common law doctrines that evidence of a
complainant's propensity to engage in consentual sexual relations
outside of marriage is relevant to infer that she was more likely to
have consented to engage in the particular sexual act in question,
22
and that unchastity23 in women is relevant to address the general
18. See generally Berger, Man's Trial, Women's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1977).
19. 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5382, at 516
(1980). For an overview of the reemergence of the Women's Movement during the 1960s see
generally J. FREEDMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION 44-70 (1975); J. HOLE & E.
LEVINE, REBIRTH OF FEMINISM 15-167 (1971). In 1966, the National Organization for
Women was formed, which was principally responsible for coordinating much of the rape-law
reform lobbying effort. Women who had participated in the President's Conference on the
Status of Women and the Civil Rights Movement of the early 1960s led the group. See Geis,
Forcible Rape: An Introduction, in FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CRIME, THE VICTIM, AND THE
OFFENDER 4 (D. Chappel, R. Geis & G. Geis eds. 1977).
20. See Berger, supra note 18, at 12-15.
21. For a list of state and federal statutes restricting the admissibility of sexual conduct
evidence in rape trials, see Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
Proposalfor the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, app. at 906-07 table 1 (1986). For a
review of commentaries on rape-shield laws see generally 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 19, §§ 5381-5393; Berger, supra note 18; Letwin, "Unchaste Character, "Ideology, and the
California Rape Evidence Laws, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 35 (1980); Ordover, Admissibility of
Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unlamented Death of Character for Chastity, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 90 (1977); Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth
Amendment, 198 U. PA. L. REV. 544 (1980).
22. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 62, at 464-66 (3d. ed.
1940); see also Comment, The Rape Victim: A Victim of Society and the Law, 11 WILLAMETrE
L. REV. 36, 40-41 (1974).
23. "Chastity" denotes abstention from premarital or extramarital intercourse. See State
v. Bird, 302 So. 2d 589, 592 (La. 1974).
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credibility of the witness.24 Of course, evidence of a rape complain-
ant's past sexual behavior is not always irrelevant. The need to intro-
duce highly relevant evidence has been lost amidst the more notorious
accounts of how the judiciary not only allowed, but also condoned the
introduction of irrelevant, prejudicial evidence against the complain-
ant. Some examples of these instances may clarify this point.
One of the most notorious cases on this subject is People v.
Abbot,25 wherein Judge Cowen articulated his view of the rape com-
plainant.26 First, he distinguished between a woman "who has
already submitted herself to the lewd embraces of another, and the
coy and modest female severely chaste and instinctively shuddering at
the thought of impurity. ' 27  From this perspective, he then asked:
"[A]nd will you not more readily infer assent in the practiced Mes-
salina, in loose attire, than in the reserved and virtuous Lucretia?" 2
Although this case dates back to 1835, Judge Cowen's sentiments
have been reiterated through the years and into modem cases. As one
contemporary court put it: "The underlying thought here is that it is
more probable that an unchaste woman would assent.., than a virtu-
ous woman." 29  Indeed, as recently as 1970, California explicitly
incorporated this notion in its standard "unchaste witness" jury
instructions.30
Once this general premise was established, defense lawyers read-
ily relied on it to support harsh and insinuating questions, such as
whether the woman in fact "asked for it"'31 and whether she
24. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 63, at 467; see infra notes 30-32 and accompanying
text.
25. 19 Wend. 192, 195-96 (N.Y. 1838), quoted in Berger, supra note 18, at 16.
26. Abbot, 19 Wend. at 194.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. People v. Collins, 25 Ill. 2d 605, 611, 186 N.E.2d 30, 33 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
942 (1963), quoted in Berger, supra note 18, at 15.
30. See, e.g., former CALJIC No. 10.06 (3d rev. ed. 1970), set forth in Note, Evidence-
Rape Trials- Victim's Prior Sexual History, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 362, 368 n.32 (1975). The
jury instruction stated:
Evidence was received for the purpose of showing that the female person
named in the information was a woman of unchaste character. A woman of
unchaste character can be the victim of a forcible rape but it may be inferred that
a woman who has previously consented to sexual intercourse would be more
likely to consent again. Such evidence may be considered by you only for such
bearing as it may have on the question of whether or not she gaveher consent to
the alleged sexual act and in judging her credibility.
Id.
31. This concept has been described as "Victim Precipitation" and is applied to cases in
which the victim either puts herself in a vulnerable situation (hitchhiking, going to a man's
apartment) or retracts from an earlier agreement to have sex. Amir, Victim Precipitated
Forcible Rape, 58 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 493, 493-97 (1967
[Vol. 43:947
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"enjoyed" 32 the sexual act that formed the basis of her complaint.
Some trial court judges even tolerated such defense conduct in cases
in which the woman had been brutally beaten.33 Professor Berger
stated in her well-documented commentary on this issue: "Cross-
examination by the defense may prove to be extremely grueling ....
[A] cold record can never convey counsel's harsh or insinuating tone
or expression of utter incredulity."34
Notably, at common law, courts only permitted character evi-
dence to be introduced in three distinct situations. First, a defendant
could introduce character evidence about himself, albeit subject to
cross-examination and rebuttal testimony by witnesses introduced by
the prosecution. 5 Second, a defendant could introduce evidence of
the victim's bad character, if the defendant was accused of homicide
and thereby relied on a theory of self-defense, or if the defendant was
accused of rape.36 Courts otherwise prohibited evidence of a com-
plainant's bad character, introduced to infer that the complainant
acted in conformity with such character. The reason for this prohibi-
tion was not that such evidence was necessarily irrelevant, 7 but
32. Cf Piercy, Missoula Rape Poem (excerpt), in SEXUAL ASSAULT (M. Walker & S.
Brodsky eds. 1976) reprinted in Berger, supra note 18, at 13 n.85 ("There is no difference
between being raped and being run over by a truck except that afterward men ask if you
enjoyed it.").
33. Eg., Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1953) (approving use of prior
sexual conduct to show consent in a situation in which the defendant brutally beat the victim),
overruled, United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 271-72 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
930 (1979).
34. Berger, supra note 18, at 13-14.
35. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 191, at 566-70 (E. Cleary
3d ed. 1984) (The prosecution was limited to rebuttal and cross-examination-there was no
independent method to introduce bad character evidence against the defendant.).
36. Id. § 191, at 566. Courts allowed defendants who relied on the theory of self-defense
in homicide cases to prove that the deceased had a reputation for engaging in violent acts. 22
C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5237, at 399 (1978).
These courts believed that the introduction of this evidence enhanced the possibility that the
deceased instigated the incident causing his death. Id. Interestingly, most courts limited the
use of this character evidence to situations in which there existed some additional evidence
that the deceased had been the aggressor. Id. Today, most courts have expanded the use of
victim characjer evidence to assault cases as well as homicide cases. IA J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 54.1, at 1150 (P. Tillers rev. ed. 1983). Unlike
homicide cases, courts did not limit the use of victim character evidence by a defendant relying
on a defense theory of consent in a rape case. Id. § 62, at 1264 & n. 10. Moreover, some courts
did not even require a defense based on consent. See, e.g., People v. Degnen, 70 Cal. App. 567,
591, 234 P. 129, 138-39 (1925) (Even though the defendant denied having any sexual relations
with the complainant, the trial court allowed him to introduce evidence of her past sexual
conduct based on the theory that a defendant must be allowed to choose between inconsistent
defenses.).
37. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 35, § 188, at 554 ("[E]vidence that an individual is the
kind of person who tends to behave in certain ways almost always has some value as
circumstantial evidence as to how he acted (and perhaps with what state of mind) in the matter
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
rather that other countervailing considerations outweighed its proba-
tive value.38 The most significant danger in admitting this type of
evidence was the potential for jury misuse.39 Courts feared that juries
might be tempted to acquit defendants on the ground that complain-
ants got what they deserved based on their bad character. 4° Although
these same concerns were present in homicide cases, common law
courts may have perceived a special need to allow this evidence to be
introduced when the defendant attempted to prove that the deceased
had been the aggressor in the affray. 41 There existed, however, no
similar justification for carving out an exception in the case of rape.
Courts simply accepted that a woman who engaged in nonmarital sex
was not entitled to protection against a jury's misuse of the
information.
The third situation, under common law, involved the use of char-
acter evidence to help juries decide the crucial issue of a witness' cred-
ibility.' 2 The general rule, however, strictly limited inquiry to acts
that involved the character trait of veracity and prohibited the admis-
sion of extrinsic evidence to rebut the witness' testimony.' 3 Despite
this general mandate, some courts took the position that unchastity in
women was relevant, not only on the issue of consent, but also as
bearing on the complainant's credibility. 44 As one early case stated:
"[S]he could not have ruthlessly destroyed that quality [chastity]
upon which most other good qualities are dependent, and for which,
above all others, a woman is reverenced and respected, and yet retain
her credit for truthfulness unsmirched . . . ., Interestingly, the
courts failed to apply this alleged correlation between promiscuity
and dishonesty to male witnesses. In State v. Sibley,46 the Missouri
Supreme Court succinctly stated that "what destroys the standing of
in question."). Dean Wigmore argued that character evidence should be excluded for policy
reasons even though it was usually probative of conduct. See 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 22,
§ 55, at 449-50, § 57, at 454.
38. See IA J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 54.1, at 1150-51.
39. Id.; FED. R. EvID. 404(a) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 221
(1973).
40. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 35, § 193, at 572.
41. Galvin, supra note 21, at 782 & n.90.
42. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 35, § 41, at 89.
43. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 35, § 41, at 89; cf. FED. R. EvID. 608 (Evidence
is limited to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.).
44. Berger, supra note 18, at 16; see, e.g., Brown v. State, 50 Ala. App. 471, 474, 280 So. 2d
177, 179 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973); Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 85, 90 S.E.2d 664, 665 (1955);
Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 467, 471, 4 N.E. 63, 65 (1885); Frank v. State, 150 Neb. 745, 753,
35 N.W.2d 816, 822 (1949).
45. State v. Coella, 3 Wash. 99, 106, 28 P. 28, 29 (1891).
46. 131 Mo. 519, 33 S.W. 167 (1895).
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[females] in all walks of life has no effect whatever on the standing for
truth for [males]." 47
Although it is beyond the scope of this Note to address all the
legal rules applicable to rape cases, it is important to recognize that
many of these rules were unique to the crime of rape.4 Most writers
account for this anomaly as the result of a male-dominated legal sys-
tem which viewed rape as "different" '49 from other crimes because of a
set of ingrained historical attitudes about women and sexuality.50
Professor Berger illustrated this point 1 by quoting People v. Benson,52
in which the court stated: "There is no [other] class of prosecutions
attended with so much danger, or which afford so ample an opportu-
nity for the free play of malice and private vengeance."' 53 Conse-
quently, there existed a general distrust and contempt for the female
accuser. Commentators have suggested that this attitude was formal-
ized into a set of legal rules unique to rape cases-the most prominent
being the rule allowing the introduction of evidence of the complain-
ant's unchaste conduct to imply consent or to impeach her
credibility.54
Feminist organizations persuasively argued to state legislators
that the decision to engage in nonmarital sexual behavior is no longer
at odds with conventional sexual norms.5" They agreed that it may
47. Id. at 532, 33 S.W. at 171.
48. Galvin, supra note 21, at 792-93 n. 139. Professor Galvin wrote:
Other practices unique to rape cases and evincing suspicion and hostility
toward the complainant included the following: the requirement that the
testimony of the complainant be corroborated by other evidence .... special jury
instructions voicing Sir Matthew Hale's fears and mandating that "you examine
the testimony of the [complainant] with caution," . . . and a requirement
unknown to prosecutions for other crimes involving forcible or nonconsentual
conduct-proof by the State that the complainant had resisted the attack to the
utmost of her physical ability as an objective indication of her nonconsent.
Id. (citation omitted).
49. See Berger, supra note 18, at 7-10; see also 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note
19, § 5382, at 508-31.
50. See S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 16-30 (1975) (describing attitudes toward
women and rape through history).
51. Berger, supra note 18, at 21.
52. 6 Cal. 221 (1856).
53. Id. at 223.
54. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text; see also 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 22,
§ 200, at 683 (warning of "the evil of putting an innocent man's liberty at the mercy of an
unscrupulous and revengeful mistress"); Ploscowe, Sex Offenses: The American Legal
Context, 25 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217, 223 (1960). Judge Ploscowe advises that
"[p]rosecuting attorneys must continually be on guard for the charge of sex offenses brought
by the spurned female that has as its underlying basis a desire for revenge or blackmail or
shakedown scheme." Id.
55. See generally Ordover, supra note 21, at 96-102.
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have been true, in an earlier day, that a woman who would dare to
defy society's strict moral standards prohibiting nonmarital sexual
behavior would be more likely to have consented in a case of rape. 6
Referring to contemporary research on sexual behavior, however,
they demonstrated that the vast majority of young women in today's
society engage in consentual sexual relations outside of marriage.
Moreover, they demonstrated that women themselves are less likely
to label themselves "good" or "bad" according to their sexual hab-
its.58 Indeed, some chaste women actively seek to lose this status, for
fear of being labeled neurotic or unpopular.5 9 In summary, these
reformers argued that the prevalence of nonmarital sexual activity in
today's society rendered such evidence useless as a predictor of
human behavior. 6° Similarly, with regard to the use of such evidence
to impeach the general credibility of the rape complainant, these
advocates emphasized the absurdity of using sexual conduct evidence
to impeach only female witnesses, particularly female witnesses in
sexual offense cases. 6I Accordingly, they concluded that, in fact,
there existed no logical connection between a woman's decision to
engage in nonmarital sexual conduct and her propensity to tell the
truth.62 In both instances their arguments rested on the most elemen-
tary principles of logic. That is, if the premises are no longer true,
then the asserted conclusion is no longer valid. Here the conclusion is
relevancy. The premise that engaging in nonmarital sexual behavior
makes it more likely that a woman consented to a particular act of
56. See Note, Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the Prior Sexual
History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflection of Reality or Denial of
Due Process?, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 403, 414 (1975).
57. A frequently cited study, based on a survey taken in 1972, M. HUNT, SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN THE 1970's 16 (1974), found that, of white women between the ages of eighteen
to twenty-four, 70% of the unmarried women had experienced intercourse, and 80% of the
married women had engaged in premarital relations. See Ordover, supra note 21, at 100. The
study also found that, of the men surveyed, 72% considered premarital sex acceptable for
women if they were "in love," and 82% found it acceptable for men if "in love." Id. at 101
n.52.
A more recent study proclaims: "It is the exceptional young person who has not had
sexual intercourse while still a teenager: Eight in ten males and seven in ten females report
having had intercourse while in their teens. Only about four percent of teenagers are married,
and about 85 percent had intercourse before marriage .... " THE ALAN GUTTMACHER
INSTITUTE, TEENAGE PREGNANCY, THE PROBLEM THAT HASN'T GONE AWAY 7 (1981),
quoted in Note, Interpreting Missouri's Rape Victim Shield Statute, 53 UMKC L. REV. 273,
277 n.20 (1985).
58. Berger, supra note 18, at 56.
59. Id.
60. See Ordover, supra note 21, at 102; see also LETWIN, supra note 21, at 59-61.
61. Galvin, supra note 21, at 800.
62. Id.
[Vol. 43:947
FEDERAL RAPE-SHIELD STATUTE
sexual intercourse, rather than that she was raped, is no longer true.
Therefore, this evidence is no longer relevant to infer consent.
Furthermore, reformers complained that admission of this evi-
dence actually deterred victims from reporting the rape and cooperat-
ing with prosecutorial efforts to achieve justice.6 3 Victims frequently
opted to remain silent when faced with probable harassment and
humiliation inflicted by a judicial system that permitted evidence of
her previous sexual conduct to be explored, even when not relevant.64
One commentator stated that a woman is "given the option to bare
the most personal parts of [her] life or abandon all hope of legal
redress."65 Faced with such a choice, it is easy to understand how
reformers elicited sympathy for the rape complainant's perception
that it was she who was on trial, not the defendant.66
Law enforcement agencies quickly jumped on the reform "band-
wagon."67 In joining forces with women's groups, police and prosecu-
tors sought to remove obstacles to the apprehension and conviction of
offenders. Together, these powerful coalitions pushed reform bills
through state legislatures with extraordinary speed and sagacity.68
Within a span of only six years, from 1974 to 1980, almost every state
had passed some form of rape reform legislation.69 In evaluating
where the federal rape-shield rule fits into this evolutionary process of
reform and how Congress intended for the rule to be applied, one
must maintain a sensitivity to the political climate created by these
legislative reform measures that swept through the states.
III. RAPE-SHIELD REFORM IN THE STATES
The lobbying efforts of reformers resulted in intense political
pressure on legislators to accept reform measures reflecting a women's
63. One frequently cited statistic estimated that forcible rape occurred at three and one-
half to twenty times the reported figure. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 20-22 (1967), quoted in Berger, supra note 18, at 5. For a critical evaluation of
arguments correlating the degree of underreporting and admissibility of the complainant's
prior sexual conduct, see 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5382, at 499-502.
64. Griffin, Rape: The All-American Crime, RAMPARTS, Sept. 1971, at 26, 30-31.
65. Id.
66. See Berger, supra note 18, at 14 n.92; see also Commonwealth v. Strube, 274 Pa. Super.
199, 207-08, 418 A.2d 365, 369 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
67. Galvin, supra note 21, at 797. For a thorough discussion of the "politics" of rape-
shield legislation, see 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5382, at 495; NAT'L
INST. OF L. ENFORCEMENT AND CRIM. JUST., U.S. DEP'T. OF JUST., FORCIBLE RAPE, AN
ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES 46-47 (1978).
68. 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5382, at 493 n.5.
69. Galvin, supra note 21, at 768 n.17, app. at 906 table 1.
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right to sexual independence and equality.7 ° Indeed, drafters of rape
reform legislation faced a formidable task-"to bring the legal rules
governing rape cases in line with those in all other criminal cases and
thereby shift the rape trial's focus from an inquiry into the complain-
ant's moral worth to a determination of the defendant's culpability. '71
Considering the complexity and careful balancing of interests
required in restructuring the laws governing the prosecution of any
crime, it is not surprising that the resultant rape-shield laws varied
widely in scope and in procedural detail.72 This is especially true in
view of the relatively short time in which states enacted such legisla-
tion. Between 1974 and 1980, almost every state had enacted some
type of rape-reform legislation. Moreover, nearly half the states had
enacted reform legislation by the time Congress enacted Federal Rule
of Evidence 412 in 1978.73
Professor Harriett R. Gavin categorized the state statutes into
four distinct conceptual approaches to rape-shield legislation.74 She
referred to these as the Michigan, Texas, Federal, and California
approaches.75  This Note primarily focuses on the Michigan and
Texas approaches because Rule 412 is a compromise between these
two statutory schemes.76 The Michigan statute and the statutes of
twenty-five states to date that are modeled after it77 represent the
restrictive end of the statutory spectrum. Texas, and its eleven follow-
ers, chose an almost diametrically opposed approach to the problem 78
and therefore represent the permissive end of the spectrum. These
distinct conceptualizations reflect the difficulty drafters faced in
attempting to balance the state's interest in protecting the complain-
ant's privacy against the rape defendant's constitutional right to
defend himself.
Michigan enacted the first rape-shield statute in 1974.79 Per-
suaded by reformers' fears that rape-shield laws could amount to
mere lip-service if judges were given any discretionary powers in
70. Id. at 767 & n.10.
71. Galvin, supra note 21, app. at 904.
72. See id. app. at 908-16 tables 2-5 (tables compare state statutory requirements and
exceptions).
73. See Ireland, Rape Reform Legislation: A New Standard of Sexual Responsibility, 49 U.
COLO. L. REV. 185, 198 n.70 (1978).
74. Galvin, supra note 21, at 773.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 775.
77. Id. app. at 906 table 1 (list of statutes following the Michigan approach).
78. Id. app. at 907 (list of statutes following the Texas approach).
79. See 1974 Mich. Pub. Acts 266, at 1025, 1028-29 (codified as amended at Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1988)).
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applying the new laws,"° the drafters wrote the statute in an exclu-
sionary form."' That is, the statute prohibits the introduction of sex-
ual conduct evidence, subject to certain enumerated exceptions. All
of the state statutes modeled after this approach are written in this
form and differ only as to the listed exceptions.8 2 These statutes effec-
tively divest trial judges of their discretion in determining the rele-
vancy or probative value of sexual conduct evidence that specifically
does not come within a statutory exclusion." Instead, these legisla-
tors have been described as attempting to "anticipate precisely those
circumstances in which sexual conduct evidence will be critical to the
presentation of a defense."8 4
A survey of the variety of conclusions reached on this question
by various state legislators adopting this exclusionary approach, how-
ever, reflects a lack of consensus among state lawmakers concerning
the circumstances under which such evidence must be admitted to
accommodate the needs of the accused. 5 This lack of consensus may
stem from a basic misperception of the exact wrong that rape-reform
legislation attempts to correct.8 6  Specifically, legislators failed to
focus on the need to exclude evidence of a rape complainant's past
sexual behavior only when its relevance relied on the invidious com-
mon law notions that a woman's consent to sexual relations with one
man implies either consent to relations with others or a lack of credi-
bility. This conclusion is further supported by the case law developed
in applying these statutes. 87 Specific examples are highlighted in this
Note subsequent to a review of the various statutory exceptions cho-
sen and the frequency of their inclusion in these Michigan-type
statutes.
The only common exception to all Michigan-type statutes is that
80. See Amsterdam & Babcock, Proposed Position on Issues Raised by the Administration
of Laws Against Rape: Memorandum for the ACLU of Northern California, reprinted in
Galvin, supra note 21, at 812 n.239 ("We are ... loath to leave determinations of general
'relevancy' to judges who are too frequently male and too frequently imbued with unreal and
insensitive attitudes toward women's sexual attitudes and experiences.").
81. See supra note 79. Michigan's rape-shield statute provides in relevant part:
"(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the
victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct shall not be
admitted... unless.. ." Id. (emphasis added).
82. For a list of various exceptions in statutes following the Michigan approach see
Galvin, supra note 21, app., at 906 table 1.
83. Id. at 773.
84. Id.
85. Id. app. at 906 table 1.
86. Id. at 812 & n.239.
87. For an in-depth analysis evaluating cases decided under various rape-shield statutes,
see id. at 812-903.
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they all permit the introduction of past sexual behavior evidence
between the complainant and the accused. 8 At least, under these cir-
cumstances, legislators have reached a consensus that the defendant's
need to introduce evidence of the complainant's past sexual behavior
must prevail. More importantly, and at the heart of the matter, this
type of evidence could never be introduced to infer that consent with
one implies consent with others, but rather is probative of the com-
plainant's state of mind toward the particular defendant.8 9 The disar-
ray of additional exceptions among these statutes indicates that
legislators missed this crucial distinction. Five states have no addi-
tional exceptions. 9 Of the twenty remaining states, fifteen allow the
defendant to "introduce evidence of specific instances of sexual con-
duct between the complainant and individuals other than [the
accused] to prove that such other individuals were the source of cer-
tain physical consequences of the alleged rape." 91 In addition all fif-
teen states allow the defendant to rebut evidence that a medical
examination conducted shortly after the alleged rape revealed the
presence of semen in the complainant's vagina for the inference that
the defendant was the source of such semen. 92
Exceptions for other physical consequences, however, are not
consistent. Seven of these fifteen states limit the admissibility of phys-
ical consequence evidence to instances that provide an alternative
explanation for the existence of pregnancy or disease.93 The remain-
ing states add the exception of injury, or alternatively allow the
defendant to introduce evidence in explanation of "all physical conse-
quences." 94 In addition to this disparity between the type of physical
consequence evidence excepted, there are at least eight more catego-
ries of exceptions scattered throughout these twenty statutes.95 The
following analysis of selected judicial applications of these restrictive
88. Seven of these statutes, however, explicitly limit the evidence to the issue of consent.
See id. at 818 n.263.
89. See Berger, supra note 18, at 58-59. Professor Vivian Berger wrote:
The inference from past to present behavior does not, as in cases of third
party acts, rest on highly dubious beliefs about "women who do" and "women
who don't" but rather relies on common sense and practical psychology.
Admission of the proof "supplies the accused with a circumstance making it
probable that he did not obtain by violence what he might have secured by
persuasion .... "
Id. (quoting Bedgood v. State, 115 Ind. 275, 279, 17 N.E. 621, 623 (1888)).
90. Galvin, supra note 21, at 814 n.245.
91. Id. at 818-19. For a list of these statutes, see id. at 819 n.265.
92. See supra note 82.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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statutes illustrates the principal flaws inherent in these statutory
schemes.
In many instances, courts ignored the clear mandate of the stat-
ute by refusing to apply the statute to the particular circumstances of
the case. For example, in Shockley v. State,96 the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals was asked to determine the constitutionality of
denying the defendant the opportunity to rebut the prosecution's evi-
dence alleging that the defendant impregnated the complainant as a
result of rape.97 The defendant denied ever having intercourse with
the complainant and sought to prove that the complainant had had
sexual relations with another person during the time in question.98
Tennessee has one of the five Michigan category statutes that only
allows an exception for evidence of prior sexual conduct between the
complainant and the accused. 99 Relying on the statute, the trial court
prohibited the defendant from introducing any evidence of the com-
plainant's prior sexual behavior."°
The appellate court reversed, but at the same time held the stat-
ute constitutionally sound. 10' The court concluded that the legisla-
ture intended the statute "to eliminate the unjustified besmirching of a
woman's reputation by examining her prior sexual activities when
such testimony is of highly dubious relevance to the issue of her later
consent or her credibility."'' 02 The court correctly focused on the
defendant's purpose for introducing evidence of past sexual conduct.
In doing so, it was determined not to apply the statute to this case
because the defendant's purpose for introducing evidence did not
come within the uses that the legislature intended to prohibit. The
court believed that applying the statute in these circumstances would
result in denying the defendant due process of law.' 0 3
Other courts have gone so far as to rewrite the applicable rape-
shield statute, in order to accommodate the accused's need to intro-
duce evidence of the complainant's past sexual conduct when rele-
vant. In State v. LaClair, °4 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
scrutinized that state's rape-shield statute. In LaClair, the defendant
attempted to exculpate himself by establishing that the complainant
96. 585 S.W.2d 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).
97. Id. at 648.
98. Id. at 648-50.
99. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
100. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-17-119 (1982).
101. Shockley, 585 S.W.2d at 651.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 121 N.H. 743, 433 A.2d 1326 (1981).
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
had sexual relations with another person the day preceding the rape
which accounted for the presence of semen found in her vagina.' 5
Although the New Hampshire statute had no provision for the intro-
duction of evidence to rebut physical consequences, 10 6 the New
Hampshire Supreme Court allowed the evidence to be introduced.1
0 7
The New Hampshire Supreme Court decision in LaClair reaf-
firmed its earlier interpretation of the statute in State v. Howard.08 In
Howard, the court interpreted the legislative intent of the statute as
protecting rape complainants from "unnecessary embarrassment,
prejudice and courtroom procedures that only serve to exacerbate the
trauma of the rape itself."' 9 The court determined that the statute
could not withstand a constitutional attack, unless the court inter-
preted it as allowing, on a case-by-case basis, a rape defendant to
demonstrate to the court that due process requires admitting sexual
conduct evidence when its probative value outweighs its prejudicial
effect. o
The Michigan Court of Appeals addressed a similar problem in
People v. Mikula.I" This case is particularly appropriate to our analy-
sis of the federal rape-shield statute as applied in United States v.
Shaw.1 2 The Michigan statute allowed the accused to introduce sex-
ual conduct evidence establishing "the source or origin of semen,
pregnancy, or disease, but not the causes of other physical conse-
quences of rape, namely injury."' 13 The complainant was a young
child who had been medically examined six months after the alleged
rape. "' The prosecution introduced a doctor's testimony that the
girl's hymenal membrane was not intact and that her vagina was
105. Id. at 746, 433 A.2d at 1329. The specific facts of LaClair are particularly remarkable.
In LaClair, doctors examined the rape complainant on the evening of the alleged rape. Id. at
747, 433 A.2d at 1329. At the trial, the attending physician testified that he found nonmotile
sperm in the complainant's vagina. Id., 433 A.2d at 1329. In response, the defendant
attempted to rebut the inference that he was responsible for the presence of this sperm by
introducing evidence that he had normal sperm motility and by arguing that motile sperm only
remains motile in the vagina for a maximum of twelve hours. Id., 433 A.2d at 1329. In spite
of the introduction of this evidence, the trial court refused to allow the defendant to rebut the
inference that he was the source of semen. Id. at 746, 433 A.2d at 1328.
106. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 632-A:6 (1986). The New Hampshire statute states in part
that "prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the actor
shall not be admitted into evidence in any prosecution under this chapter." Id.
107. LaClair, 121 N.H. at 746-48, 433 A.2d at 1329-30.
108. 121 N.H. 53, 426 A.2d 457 (1981).
109. Id. at 57, 426 A.2d at 459.
110. Id. at 58-59, 426 A.2d at 460-61.
111. 84 Mich. App. 108, 112, 269 N.W.2d 195, 197 (1978).
112. 824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987).
113. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.520j(F)(b) (West Supp. 1988).
114. Mikula, 84 Mich. App. at 112, 269 N.W.2d at 197.
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unusually open for a child of her age.' 5 The defendant sought to
prove that the complainant had engaged in sexual activity with a four-
teen-year-old boy several months prior to the alleged incident, in
order to rebut the inference that he was responsible for her physical
condition." 6 The Michigan Court of Appeals found that the legisla-
ture did not intend to limit the accused to eliciting evidence regarding
only those physical consequences specifically enumerated in the stat-
ute." 7 Again, by focusing on the defendant's purpose for introducing
the evidence, the court found that the statute did not control." 8 The
court specifically stated that the proof in this case "has no more
potential for harassment of a complainant than proof of the origin of
one of the conditions expressly included in the statute.""I9
The foregoing examples illustrate how judges struggled with
restrictive statutory language, in order to admit highly relevant evi-
dence they believed crucial to an adequate defense. Although this
may appear to fly in the face of rape-shield statutes, in fact, introduc-
tion of this evidence, specifically limited to the issue of identity, as
opposed to consent or credibility, does no violence to the policies
underlying the rape-shield laws. Violence occurs when the evidence is
prejudicial or irrelevant, not when it is highly relevant. Thus, legisla-
tors did not need to distinguish between the type of physical conse-
quence a defendant could rebut. This is true because a defendant's
only purpose in rebutting evidence alleged to be a physical conse-
quence of rape is to deny having a sexual encounter with the com-
plainant-consentual or otherwise. Nevertheless, even under these
circumstances, the prejudicial effect of introducing evidence of the
complainant's past sexual behavior may outweigh its probative value.
As written, however, these restrictive statutes do not allow judges to
make this type of determination. The flaw of inflexibility inherent in
these statutes stems from an attempt to protect the rape complainant
from the biased views of a male-dominated judiciary. 20 Ironically,
this is the same reason legislatures enacted the statutes in the first
place.
Not all states, however, approach the problem with such skepti-
cism. In fact, the states following the Texas approach base their rape-
shield statutes on judicial discretion.' 2' Some view this approach as
115. Id.
116. Id. at 111, 269 N.W.2d at 197.
117. Id. at 114, 269 N.W.2d at 198.
118. Id., 269 N.W.2d at 198.
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
121. See Berger, supra note 18, at 69; Galvin, supra note 21, at 876.
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nothing more than a reminder to the trial judge that sexual conduct
evidence is not admissible, unless the defendant proves the relevancy
in that particular case according to the traditional standards of bal-
ancing probative value against the prejudicial effect to the complain-
ant. 122 Such determination of relevancy, however, must be made at
an in-camera proceeding prior to the offering of the evidence. 23 Pro-
ponents of this approach contend that this provision reconciles the
competing interests between the complainant's privacy interests and
the acccused's constitutional right to confront his accuser. 24 On the
other hand, critics echoing the rationale underlying the Michigan-
type statutes doubt the ability of judges to shed their previously held
notions about women and sexuality and to heed the intended message
from legislators, without being forced to do so through substantive
restrictions. 125
Interestingly, case law reflects a keen understanding and sensitiv-
ity to the legislative intent. 26 Two such cases suffice to demonstrate
this point. In People v. Mckenna, 27 the Colorado Supreme Court
held:
The basic purpose of [the statute] is one of public policy: to
provide rape and sexual assault victims greater protection from
humiliating and embarrassing public "fishing expeditions" into
their past sexual conduct, without a preliminary showing that evi-
dence thus elicited will be relevant to some issue in the pending
case. The statute represents one means chosen by the general
assembly to overcome the reluctance of victims of sex crimes to
report them for prosecution. 28
122. See Note, Forcible Rape: The Law in Texas, 9 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 563, 577 (1978).
123. Galvin, supra note 21, app. at 912 table 3.
124. For example, the policy adopted by the Board of Directors of the American Civil
Liberties Union states in part that:
[C]areful application by trial judges of the proper standards of relevance of
testimony, control of cross-examination and argument, and elimination of
prejudicial instructions unique to rape and similar cases could do much to
preserve rape complainants from unnecessary imposition upon their rights to
sexual privacy, without detracting from the fairness of the trial.
Policy of the American Civil Liberties Union, adopted February, 1976, quoted in Herman,
What's Wrong With the Rape Reform Laws?, 3 Civ. LIBERTIES REV. 60, 63 (Dec. 1976-Jan.
1977); see also People v. Mckenna, 196 Colo. 367, 373-74, 585 P.2d 275, 279 (1978) (en banc)
(in-camera hearing balances victim's privacy interest against defendant's right to introduce
relevant evidence); State v. Green, 163 W. Va. 681, 687-93, 260 S.E.2d 257, 261-64 (1979)
(discussing the variety of rape-shield laws and recommending that the legislature adopt provi-
sion for in-camera hearing).
125. See Berger, supra note 18, at 71.
126. For a review of several cases decided under the Texas approach, see Galvin, supra note
21, at 880-81.
127. 196 Colo. 367, 585 P.2d 275 (1978).
128. Id. at 371-72, 585 P.2d at 278 (emphasis in original).
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One would expect the facts of State v. Romero 129 to elicit any
repressed bias toward female unchastity, if the critics' fears of this
statutory scheme are taken seriously. In Romero, the defendant
sought to introduce evidence that the victim was a prostitute. 130 The
New Mexico Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's exclusion of this
evidence in the absence of a defense claim that the sexual act in ques-
tion had been an agreed-upon act of prostitution.13 ' The court stated
that, "[i]t is not the province of the jury to pass moral judgment on
the victim, and the court should remove the temptation to do so
whenever possible." 132
Professor Galvin points out, however, that a survey of the case
law applying the Texas-type statutes may not portray an accurate pic-
ture of the judiciary's response. 133 If trial judges applying these per-
missive statutes continue to admit irrelevant and prejudicial sexual
conduct evidence, therefore causing rape defendants to go free, such
cases will go unreported because of the state's inability to appeal a
finding of not guilty, 134 and because of the nearly universal prohibi-
tion against interlocutory appeals from evidentiary rulings in criminal
cases. 1
35
The preceding overview of state legislative approaches to rape-
shield statutes does not include a discussion of the California
approach.136 This Note is not attempting to conduct a general survey
of rape-shield laws, but rather it attempts to analyze those state stat-
utes that can provide valuable insight for an interpretation of the fed-
eral rape-shield statute as applied in Shaw. To that extent, the
California approach is not relevant to our discussion. 137
129. State v. Romero, 94 N.M. 22, 606 P.2d 1116 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
130. Id. at 25, 606 P.2d at 1119.
131. Id. at 26, 606 P.2d at 1120.
132. Id.
133. Galvin, supra note 21, at 879.
134. Id.; see 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5382, at 496-97.
135. Galvin, supra note 21, at 879. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982); 3 W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.2(a), at 182-87 (1984).
136. For a list of statutes following the California approach, see Galvin, supra note 21, app.
at 907 table 1.
137. Under this approach, evidence of past sexual conduct is separated into two broad
categories. Galvin, supra note 21, at 775. If the defendant offers the evidence to prove consent
by the complainant, then it is categorized as substantive. Id. On the other hand, if the
defendant offers the evidence to impeach the complainant's credibility, then it is categorized as
credibility evidence. Id. States following this approach will exclude a specific category of
evidence. Id. Professor Galvin criticizes this type of legislation because the two categories are
not mutually exclusive. Id. As a result, in any particular case, the statutory prohibition can be
circumvented. Id.
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IV. AN ANALYSIS OF RULE 412 AS APPLIED IN SHAW
Understandably, the Shaw court had little legislative history to
which it could turn for guidance in applying Rule 412. Moreover,
because Congress drafted Rule 412 without the advice and expertise
of an advisory committee,1 38 the court did not have available an
authority often relied on for interpreting federal rules. The fact that
very few rape trials are heard in federal court further compounded the
problem, and therefore little or no case law had developed under the
new amendment. 3 9 Shaw, in fact, was the first case to address the
injury exception issue. Therefore, the court was faced with a less than
straight forward task in interpreting and applying Rule 412's injury
exception. Unfortunately, the court allowed the absence of advisory
committee notes and case law to hinder, rather than to facilitate, its
understanding of the type of injuries that should fall within the Rule's
exception. The following analysis of the court's rationale illustrates
this criticism.
The Shaw court cited United States v. Kasto ' as support for its
conclusion that Congress intended to exclude all physical conse-
quence evidence other than semen and injuries evidenced by a cut,
bruise, or the like. 4 I In Kasto, decided only three weeks before Con-
gress enacted Rule 412,142 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit overruled the longstanding doctrine adopted in Pack-
ineau v. United States 143 that prior sexual behavior with others is gen-
erally relevant on the issue of consent and credibility.'" The Kasto
court expressed the view that both logic and human experience dic-
tate that this evidence should not be admissible because its probative
value is outweighed by its highly prejudicial effect. 4 ' Moreover, the
court distinguished between evidence that may be relevant and thus
138. 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5381, at 483.
139. Federal courts' jurisdiction to hear rape cases is limited to situations in which an
alleged rape occurs within the areas of special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States or an Indian Reservation. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (1986). Only forty-two
defendants were tried in federal courts on rape charges. H.R. 14666, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1976); 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5381, at 484 n.4.
140. 584 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979).
141. Shaw, 824 F.2d at 605-08.
142. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided the Kasto opinion
on September 18, 1978. Kasto, 584 F.2d at 268. The House of Representatives passed Rule
412 on October 10, 1978, and the Senate passed the Rule on October 12, 1978. 23 C. WRIGHT
& K. GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5381, at 484-85. Congress signed Rule 412 into law on
October 30, 1978. Id.
143. 202 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1953).
144. Kasto, 584 F.2d at 270-72.
145. Id. at 270-71. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
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sufficiently probative to warrant admission and evidence of unchastity
directed solely to establishing bad moral character and impinging
credibility, which is never relevant or admissible.146 In referring to
relevant evidence of past sexual behavior, the court held that, when
"the evidence is explanative of a physical fact which is in evidence at
trial, such as the presence of semen, pregnancy, or the victim's physi-
cal condition indicating intercourse," 14 7 the trial court should balance
its probative value against any unfair prejudice that may result to the
complainant and admit the evidence accordingly. 148
The Shaw court construed Congress' enactment of Rule 412 in
the wake of Kasto as a denouncement of the rule applied in that
case.' 4 9 The court reasoned that "Congress could have done nothing
and allowed the courts to be guided by Kasto."'50 Instead, the court
explained that "Congress chose . . . to enact the Rule 412 injury
exception and prohibit past sexual behavior evidence in numerous sit-
uations where such evidence would be highly probative."'' At first
blush, the court seems to have correctly applied a basic principle of
statutory construction: When Congress passes legislation on a point
of law already established by case law, absent evidence to the con-
trary, it is reasonable to infer that Congress meant to amend or over-
rule this case law. The court, however, erred in applying this
principle to this specific legislation. A review of the circumstances
surrounding the Rule's passage reveals that the court relied on the
unsupportable premise that Congress would not have passed Rule 412
if it had been satisfied with Kasto.
In passing Rule 412, Congress responded to a political need
rather than a practical one. The few number of rape cases tried in
federal court suggested that abuse of rape complainants was not a
major problem facing Congress. Rather, the Senators and House
Representatives eagerly demonstrated their support for progressive
rape-shield legislation, a popular political issue. Regardless of the
Kasto holdings, Rule 404(a)(2) simply did not look like a rape-shield
law. Rule 412 did, and irrespective of its limited jurisdictional effect,
it showed Congress' approval of those states that had already enacted
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
146. Kasto, 584 F.2d. at 271-72 nn.2-3.
147. Id. at 271 n.2.
148. Id. at 271-72.
149. Shaw, 824 F.2d at 606-07.
150. Id. at 606.
151. Id.
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some type of reform legislation1 52 and provided a model for those
states that had yet to enact a rape-shield law. President Carter
expressly stated this notion upon signing the bill into law: "This bill
provides a model for state and local revision of criminal and case
law." '153 In fact, Congress' intent in enacting Rule 412 is quite com-
patible with Kasto, as evidenced by the fact that the Kasto court sup-
ported its decision by referring to the same literature used by reform
organizations to lobby Congress for the passage of the Rule.1 54 The
Kasto court adopted the essential position of the rape-reform move-
ment-that the admissibility analysis should focus on the purpose for
which the accused offered the evidence.
As a general rule, for purposes of consent and credibility, evi-
dence of past sexual behavior should be excluded.155 At the same
time, such evidence should be admitted when highly probative and
offered for other purposes, such as identity. 156 If Rule 412 is to pro-
duce results in accordance with the movement responsible for its crea-
tion,15 7 the Shaw decision must be overruled and the Rule construed
consistently with the Kasto holding. The alternative is the illogical
results reached in Shaw, which bar highly probative evidence for no
justifiable reason. Of course, Congress did not follow the Kasto
framework by casting Rule 412 exclusively in the form of judicial dis-
cretion, thus adopting a strict Texas-type approach.15 Instead, Con-
gress seemingly accepted the notion that, without guidance, judges
might not exercise their discretion to protect rape complainants from
the introduction of irrelevant or prejudicial past sexual behavior
evidence. 159
'As originally proposed, Rule 412 followed the exclusionary form
of the Michigan-type statutes, but was not identical to the Michigan
statute itself. 16 Judicial discretion was thus limited to determining if
proffered evidence of past sexual behavior properly came within a
listed exception and if its probative value outweighed any resultant
152. Over half the states had already passed some type of rape-shield legislation. Berger,
supra note 18, at 32; 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5238, at 411.
153. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
154. Kasto, 584 F.2d at 271 n. 1. In fact, the Kasto court cited several authors used as
support within this Note: Professors Ordover and Berger. Id.
155. Id. at 271-72.
156. Id.
157. See supra note 154.
158. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
160. H.R. 408, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 19, § 5238, at 411 n.7. See also MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.788(10) (Callaghan 1982)
("Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source of origin of semen,
pregnancy, or disease.").
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prejudice. Like the other restrictive statutes, there existed one cate-
gory that excepted evidence of sexual conduct between the complain-
ant and the accused. 61 A second category excepted sexual conduct
evidence between the complainant and others when necessary for the
accused to rebut an inference that he was the source of semen, disease,
pregnancy, or injury. 161
For purposes of this discussion, Congress made two significant
alterations before the bill ultimately passed. First, the final version
added a third category of exception to the general prescription against
introducing evidence of past sexual behavior. Specifically, such evi-
dence could be admitted if deemed by the judge to be constitutionally
required. 16' This broadly stated exception allows the judiciary to
retain some discretionary powers not otherwise available under the
previous draft. Second, Congress struck "pregnancy" and "disease"
from the previously listed circumstances that allowed the introduc-
tion of evidence pertaining to past sexual behavior between the com-
plainant and others. 6
At this point, it is important to realize that, by the time the
House introduced the amended bill in the next congressional session,
at least one state rape-shield statute had been in effect for up to four
years. 165 Significantly, courts interpreting the Michigan-type statutes
had already engaged in creative judicial legislation, in order to admit
highly relevant past sexual behavior evidence that the accused had not
offered for the inference of consent or for purposes of credibility. 166
These restrictive statutes were labeled as underinclusive and in jeop-
ardy of violating defendants' constitutional rights to due process of
law. 167  Some states had even resorted to amending these newly
enacted statutes in response to the developing case law. 168
161. H.R. 408, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 19, § 5238, at 411 n.7.
162. Id.
163. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1). Interestingly, Congress even restricted this section to
evidence other than opinion or reputation testimony. Presumably, Congress determined that
opinion or reputation testimony pertaining to a complainant's past sexual behavior could never
be constitutionally required.
164. Id. at 412(b)(2)(B).
165. The Michigan legislature enacted the Michigan rape-shield law on August 12, 1974.
See supra note 79. Congress enacted Rule 412 on October 30, 1978. See supra note 142.
166. See supra notes 97-119 and accompanying text.
167. See Galvin, supra note 21, at 775.
168. See Act of June 24, 1983, ch. 83-258, § 1, 1983 Fla. Laws 1315, 1315-16 (amending
Act of June 6, 1977, ch. 77-104, § 237, 1977 Fla. Laws 245, 329) (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 794.022-20 (West Supp. 1985)); Act of Mar. 28,1983, Pub. L. No. 322, § 1, 1983
Ind. Acts 1966, 1966-68 (amending Act of May 5, 1981, Pub. L. No. 298, § 6, 1981 Ind. Acts
2314, 2389-90) (codified as amended at IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4(b)(3) (Bums 1985); Act
of July 27, ch. 822, § 1(5)(a), 1977 Or. Laws 863, 864 (amending Act of May 20, 1975, ch. 176,
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In. contrast, Texas-type statutes allow judicial discretion to admit
evidence at trial, without declaring the law invalid or bending the
rigid legislative terms to cover the circumstances presented. 169 At the
same time, however, such unrestrained discretion arguably could
allow the judge to bypass the policy protections intended by the legis-
lature. Accordingly, these statutes are criticized as not providing suf-
ficient protection for rape complainants against irrational and biased
rulings and thus are termed overinclusive. 17 °
By amending the original bill to include key features of each
model, Congress avoided the underinclusiveness of the Michigan
approach and the overinclusiveness of the Texas approach. 17 1 Like
the Michigan approach, Rule 412 is drafted in an exclusionary for-
mat, thus creating a presumption that past sexual behavior evidence is
not admissible. Yet the Rule provides several exceptions that permit
the introduction of sexual conduct evidence considered indisputably
relevant to an effective defense. This feature is also characteristic of
the Michigan approach; however, by using a general "injury" excep-
tion, Rule 412 avoids the need to list each specific injury-hence
avoiding the obvious pitfall of omitting a necessary but unforeseen
exception. Finally, like the Texas approach, Rule 412 contains a
catchall provision that authorizes the trial judge to exercise judicial
discretion in determining when nonexcepted sexual conduct evidence
must be admitted on constitutional grounds. Congress has made a sig-
nificant statement by grounding judicial discretion in constitutional
terms-trial courts are not to use such limited discretionary powers as
a back door to introduce evidence otherwise prohibited. Instead,
Congress intended this provision to be used in "those infrequent cir-
cumstances"' 172 not adequately provided for by the Rule's specific
exceptions. It follows then that "injury" should be broadly inter-
preted. This makes sense if the phrase "those infrequent circum-
stances" is correctly interpreted as being limited to "unexpected and
idiosyncratic cases."1 73 In contrast, cases involving evidence of physi-
cal consequences allegedly resulting from rape, for example, disease,
pregnancy, and the condition of the complainant's hymen are neither
infrequent, unexpected or idiosyncratic. Therefore, when the statute is
§ 2(4), 1975 Or. Laws 219, 219) (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.210)
(1984)).
169. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
171. See Berger, supra note 18, at 33; Galvin, supra note 21, at 775.
172. 124 CONG. REC. H11944, daily ed., October 10, 1978 (remarks of Representative
Mann).
173. 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5387, at 564.
[Vol. 43:947
FEDERAL RAPE-SHIELD STATUTE
read as a whole, it is evident that the Shaw court's interpretation of
Rule 412's injury exception is shortsighted.
This conclusion is supported by an analysis of the Eighth Cir-
cuit's attempt to define injury by resorting to its "common mean-
ing." 7 4 The court has placed great emphasis on the expert testimony
of several doctors who described the physiological process that results
in a female's hymenal membrane losing its intactness. 175 The court
has concluded that, since this process is not really a rupture, as doc-
tors once commonly believed, but rather a stretching out of the mem-
brane-a physiological accommodation-it does not constitute an
injury. 176 Specifically, the court held: "The absence of all these indi-
cia, [cuts, scratches, bruises, blood, scars, injury to the vaginal canal,
or tears that may have healed], however, strongly suggests that while
the condition of [the complainant's] vaginal area may have changed,
she was not injured."' 177 The court therefore suggested that the "com-
monly understood meaning"'' 71 of injury is limited to cuts, scratches,
bruises, and the like. 179
The court, however, failed to explain the basis for its conclusion
that this is the common meaning of the word. In fact, one does not
need to look any further than an ordinary dictionary to question this
assumption. Injury is defined as "the act or result involving impair-
ment or destruction of right, health, freedom, soundness, or loss of
something of value."'' 0 In the context of rape, the loss of an intact
hymen is both a destruction of right and freedom, as well as, a loss of
something of value. Moreover, courts uniformly have held that a
"legal injury" occurs when one violates the legal right of another or
inflicts an actionable wrong."'1 Indeed, if a rape victim brings a civil
action for battery, 18 2 it is noteworthy that the victim will have no diffi-
culty in meeting the criteria for bodily harm. According to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, "bodily harm is any physical impair-
174. United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601, 608 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1033
(1988).
175. Id. at 604-05.
176. Id. at 605.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 608.
179. Id.
180. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1164 (1970).
181. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 924 (4th ed. 1968).
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1977). Regarding battery, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts provides:
Battery: Harmful Contact
An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the
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ment of the condition of another's body."18 3 Physical impairment, in
turn, results "if the structure or function of any part of the other's
body is altered to any extent even though the alteration causes no
other harm."'81 4 The Shaw court readily admitted that the complain-
ant's vaginal area may have "changed,"1 85 thus meeting the necessary
criteria for bodily harm.
Up to this point, we have seen that such a "change" '86 suffi-
ciently establishes bodily harm in a civil action and comes well within
both a legal and lay definition of injury. Moreover, the court's con-
clusion that, "even if this physical condition was the result of sexual
intercourse, it is not an injury"18 7 contradicts the substantive theory
underlying the crime of statutory rape. Statutory rape is based on the
legislative determination that sexual intercourse with a girl below a
proscribed age results in such a detriment and violation to her well-
being that consent is irrelevant. 88 Yet the court ruled that the medi-
cal evidence presented by the prosecution "may describe a physiologi-
cal accommodation, but falls short of establishing an injury." 189 Is it
not this physiological accommodation against which young girls are
meant to be protected? The court's position would be understandable
if the discussion was related to the normal physiological process that
occurs after sexual intercourse between willing and competent partici-
pants. To this extent, the stretching of the hymenal membrane is not
an injury, but a normal result of the sexual act. This, however, pre-
supposes that the sexual act involved a normal interaction. Since
intercourse resulting from rape and statutory rape, by definition, is
not a normal interaction, the natural consequences that follow are not
normal. The limited meaning the court assigned to injury, in the con-
text of rape or related offenses, is therefore inconsistent with the sub-
stantive crime.
The court conceded that, as a consequence of assigning this
restrictive definition to the injury exception, there could be numerous
situations in which past sexual behavior evidence, although highly
person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a
conduct, and
(b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly
results.
Id.
183. Id. at § 15.
184. Id. at § 15 comment a (emphasis added).
185. Shaw, 824 F.2d at 605 (emphasis added).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2032 (1982).
189. Shaw, 824 F.2d at 605.
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probative, will nevertheless be prohibited.'90 The court based this rul-
ing on the compromise Congress reached in enacting Rule 412191-
that is, the compromise of balancing the competing interests of "the
defendant's need to introduce relevant evidence... [against] the com-
plainant's interest in not having her sexual history publicly disclosed
and society's concomitant interest in having rapes reported and effec-
tively prosecuted."' 192 The court concluded that, in arriving at this
compromise, "Congress distinguished between physical consequences
that are injuries and those that are not, [and therefore] did not select a
point based solely on relevancy considerations at which to draw the
line of admissibility."' 193
Remarkably, in focusing on Congress' attempt to balance com-
peting interests, the court failed to consider the fundamental structure
of the Rule. Consider the court's reasoning: Congress opted to
restrict the definition of injury to physical consequences evidenced by
a scratch, cut, bruise, or the like; consequently, all other physical con-
sequences, such as pregnancy and disease, are categorically excluded
from the exception. The court conceded that, although all physical
consequences are highly probative, Congress created this distinction
in order to balance competing interests. The court, however, ignores
the fact that subsection (c)(3) of Rule 412194 specifically provides for
the exclusion of relevant evidence, if the accused cannot establish that
the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of unfair
prejudice. Thus it was not necessary for Congress to purposely
exclude highly probative evidence in order to balance the interests
between the parties. Instead, section (c)(3) allows the court to deter-
mine, on a case-by-case basis, if relevant evidence is more prejudicial
to the complainant than helpful to the accused. Furthermore, this
result comports with the underlying purposes of rape reform by
excluding only irrelevant or prejudicial evidence of past sexual behav-
ior. Conversely, the court's interpretation summarily excludes highly
probative evidence, even though the defendant is not relying on the
prohibited purposes of consent or credibility.
The court's rationale is similar to that underlying an evidentiary
privilege. A privilege bars the admission of relevant evidence, thereby
suppressing the truth in the interest of furthering policies of social
importance extrinsic to the fact-finding process. 195 In contrast, rape-
190. Id. at 607.
191. Id. at 606-07.
192. Id. at 606.
193. Id. at 607.
194. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(3).
195. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS, 800 (1983).
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shield laws exclude irrelevant and prejudicial evidence that does noth-
ing but taint the fact-finding process. 96 There is no reason to infer
that Congress intended to create a privilege on behalf of the complain-
ant that would result in exclusion of highly probative evidence. The
aim of rape-shield legislation is to exclude irrelevant or prejudicial
evidence because it results in humiliation, harassment, and needless
embarrassment for the complainant. 197 Hence, in order to protect the
complainant, a privilege is not necessary; rather, it is necessary to
exclude past sexual behavior evidence when offered for the prohibited
purpose of consent or credibility. This view is reflected in President
Carter's statement upon signing the bill into law:
[This bill] is designed to end the public degradation of rape
victims and, by protecting victims from humiliation, to encourage
the reporting of rape.
There is no question that victims of rape and other sex crimes,
predominantly women, are reluctant to report these crimes. Too
often rape trials have been as humiliating as the sexual assault
itself. By restricting testimony on the victim's prior sexual behav-
ior to that genuinely relevant to the defense, the rape victim's act
will prevent a defendant from making the victim's private life the
issue in the trial.198
As a result, the Shaw court went too far in its evaluation of how
the statute would benefit the rape complainant. As President Carter
stated, Congress did not intend to exclude testimony "genuinely rele-
vant to the defense,"' 199 in order to protect the complainant. Further-
more, introduction of genuinely relevant testimony does not violate
the policies underlying rape-shield legislation and therefore need not
be excluded in order to protect the complainant.
Alternatively, the court supports its interpretation of the injury
exception by addressing a statement made by the bill's sponsor Repre-
sentative Holtzman. 200 Referring specifically to subsection (b)(2)(A)
of Rule 412, she explained that this subdivision allows the admission
of evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct when "the evidence
rebuts the victim's claim that the rape caused certain physical conse-
quences, such as semen or injury. ' 20 1 The court pointed to Holtz-
man's "such as" language and found that this statement supported its
196. Galvin, supra note 21, at 887.
197. Id.
198. 14 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1902 (October 30, 1978)
(emphasis added).
199. Id.
200. See 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978).
201. Id. (emphasis added).
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conclusion that Congress intended the injury exception to cover only
limited, enumerated physical consequences. 20 2
At this point, the court's reasoning goes awry. In attempting to
explain away the suggestions that the "such as" language is only illus-
trative of other "physical consequences" and therefore could include a
ruptured hymen, the court admitted that Representative Holtzman's
statement amounted to a mere reiteration of her previous statement
concerning the original draft.2 "3 The court explained that, in her first
statement she discussed the four listed exceptions of semen, preg-
nancy, disease, or injury and, in doing so, abbreviated her remarks to
semen or injury. 2°4 The court implied that it is therefore evident that
she did not mean to include a ruptured hymen, but did mean to
include pregnancy and disease. 2 5
The problem here is that the court cannot have it both ways. If
Representative Holtzman merely reiterated an earlier statement, then
the same meaning must be assigned to both of them. The court, how-
ever, claims on the one hand that "such as semen or injury" was short
for semen, pregnancy, disease or injury, and thus "such as" should
not be interpreted to include other physical consequences,20 6 specifi-
cally a ruptured hymen. On the other hand, the court claims that the
same statement evidences the intent that only semen or injury be
included in the exception and not pregnancy and disease.20 7 The
court then explains away the "such as" language by referring back to
the argument that it merely amounted to an abbreviated remark-
that is, Holtzman actually meant semen, pregnancy, disease or injury.
This argument is circular and cannot support the claimed proposition.
Indeed, the court's reasoning supports the opposite point of view.
When Representative Holtzman discussed the amended bill, she reit-
erated the same statement that she had made when she discussed the
original bill. It is reasonable to infer from this that she did not think
the new bill rendered a substantive change requiring her to amend her
statement. Instead, since her first statement was clearly illustrative, it
follows, that by reiterating it, she meant it to remain illustrative.
Pregnancy and disease therefore would not be excluded, but included
among other possible physical consequences constituting an injury.
This point is further supported by the fact that only pregnancy and
202. Shaw, 824 F.2d at 607.
203. Id. at 607 n.7.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 607.
207. Id.
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disease can feasibly be brought under a general injury exception.
Since semen clearly could not, Congress separately retained it.
The court next points out that Representative Holtzman's state-
ment included the phrase "certain physical consequences, "208 thus
indicating that she did not mean all physical consequences. 2°9 If
Congress only intended certain physical consequences to fall within
the Rule's exception, then surely this category must include those
physical consequences that can only occur as a result of sexual inter-
course. Instead, the Shaw court decided that a broken nose exempli-
fies the type of physical consequence that constitutes an injury.210
This type of injury, however, can be the result of an infinite number of
occurrences that have no connection to a sexual crime. In contrast,
the court determined that the physical consequence of an eleven-year-
old girl's stretched hymenal membrane did not constitute an injury,2 II
even though this condition could have resulted only from sexual inter-
course. Furthermore, if evidence of a broken nose is to be relevant at
a rape trial, two inferences must be made: one, that the defendant in
fact caused the injury, and two, that the defendant caused the injury
during the commission of a sexual crime. For a minor's ruptured
hymen to be relevant at a rape trial, the only inference necessary is
that the defendant directly caused the hymen to rupture. Therefore,
the court, in effect, has excluded from the definition of injury those
physical consequences immediately related to proof of a sexual crime.
At the same time, the court has included within the meaning of injury
those physical consequences only tenuously connected, if at all, to an
act of sex. This absurd result is directly related to the court's lack of
insight in interpreting the Rule's language and its origin.
Finally the Shaw court reasoned that calling the physical condi-
tion of a complainant's hymenal membrane an "injury" would contra-
dict Congress's intention to subject Rule 412 to stringent temporal
limitations.2"2 In support of this conclusion, the court cited Repre-
sentative Mann's statement,213 in which he indicated that courts
should consider, among other facts and circumstances, the amount of
time that has lapsed between the alleged prior act and the rape
charged.21 4 Representative Mann concluded that, "[t]he greater the
lapse of time, . . . the less likely it is that such evidence will be
208. Id. (emphasis in original).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 606.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 607-08.
213. Id. at 607.
214. Id.
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admitted."21
The court interpreted Mann's statement to mean that Congress
meant to restrict subsection (b)(2)(A) of Rule 412 to only those physi-
cal consequences that could be rebutted by evidence limited to sexual
activity occurring a short time-probably a few days-before the
alleged rape.21 6 Thus the court concluded that Congress must have
deleted pregnancy and disease from the final bill because they are
"both consequences that can be caused by sexual activity occurring
many months in the case of 'pregnancy,' and possibly many years, in
the case of 'disease,' before the alleged rape. '21 7 Similarly, the court
reasoned that the condition of a complainant's hymen is a conse-
quence that could have been caused by sexual activity occurring a
substantial amount of time before the alleged acts, and therefore that
it should not be included in the injury exception.21 8 Instead, "only
when the evidence establishes an injury-such as a cut, bruise, or
tear-that was sustained reasonably close in time to the alleged
rape, ' 219 should the exception be triggered.
The court's analysis is problematic. First, the strict temporal
limitation suggested by the court is difficult to reconcile with the
"common meaning" 220 assigned to injury in another section of the
court's opinion. In that section, the court lists "tears that may have
healed, or scars"2 21 as properly coming within the "common mean-
ing" of injury.222 Evidence to rebut the presence of a scar, however,
cannot be limited to sexual activity occurring within a few days of the
alleged rape. This is true because scars generally cannot form within
a few days. Thus the court's own analysis is internally inconsistent.
The court further stated that pregnancy is a consequence that
can originate many months before the alleged rape, and that therefore
the defendant feasibly can offer evidence of sexual activity with others
during those months. 223 In that circumstance, however, the govern-
ment would not be claiming that the defendant impregnated the com-
plainant as a result of the rape. In order to prove the source of a
pregnancy, allegedly the result of rape, the defendant necessarily
would be restricted to offering evidence of sexual activity occurring
215. Id. (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978)) (emphasis added).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 608.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 605.
222. Id. at 608.
223. See id. at 607-08.
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within a few weeks before or after the act in question. The court,
however, was under the impression that the defendant would be able
to utilize up to a nine-month span to introduce evidence of past sexual
activity.
The situation is somewhat different if the complainant claims
that she contracted a venereal disease from the defendant. In this
case, evidence can be offered to prove the complainant contracted the
disease many years earlier. Thus this is the type of problem that can
be resolved by applying Representative Mann's temporal restric-
tion.224 Similarly, the condition of a hymenal membrane, at issue in
Shaw,225 falls into this category. If no other evidence exists to limit
the time in question, such as previous medical examinations, then
arguably the defendant can attempt to introduce evidence of past sex-
ual behavior starting from day one. The court, however, has failed to
recognize that the defendant can also attempt to prove the existence
of these physical consequences by offering proof of sexual activity
between the complainant and another during the relevant time in
question. Thus Representative Mann's statement 226 could just as rea-
sonably be interpreted as a warning: the greater the lapse of time
between the alleged prior act and the rape charged, the less probative
the evidence will be and thus the less likely that such evidence will be
admitted.
For example, evidence offered by the accused to prove the source
of a venereal disease contracted by the complainant could be testi-
mony by Witness X who claims he had sexual intercourse with the
complainant two days prior to the date of the charged rape. Witness
X may also have medical testimony to substantiate that he in fact had
the disease. Introduction of this evidence is highly probative and no
more prejudicial to the complainant than if the accused introduced
Witness X's testimony as proof of the source of semen. On the other
hand, if the accused offered the testimony of Witnesses X, Y and Z
that two, three, and four years ago they had sexual intercourse with
the complainant and therefore could have transmitted a venereal dis-
ease to her at that time, then this evidence clearly would lack suffi-
cient probative value to outweigh the prejudicial effect to the
complainant. Thus the evidence would be excluded under subsection
(c)(3) of the Rule. Therefore, there is no reason to construe Represen-
tative Mann's statement as an indication that Congress meant entirely
to exclude physical consequences that could be proved by past sexual
224. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
225. Shaw, 824 F.2d at 601.
226. Id. at 607.
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behavior occurring a considerable time before the alleged rape. On
the contrary, the point to be learned from Representative Mann's
statement 227 is that evidence of a rape complainant's past sexual
behavior will not be admitted unless it is highly probative. Once
again, this interpretation is consistent with the underlying purposes of
rape reform.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the federal rape-shield law, Federal Rule of
Evidence 412, to prevent the traditional abuse directed at a complain-
ant of rape or a related offense. The abuse resulted from the contin-
ued application of a rule of evidence that no longer served its purpose.
The issue raised sensitive political issues resulting in a radical nation-
wide reform movement, each state attempting to meet quickly the
reformers' demands to abolish this overtly sexist and biased practice
in the courts. Subsequent case law, however, reflected various
problems with the different approaches taken by legislatures. It has
been demonstrated that, in many instances, courts resorted to redraft-
ing the applicable statute, while others held the statute unconstitu-
tional as applied. In addition, state legislatures reacted by amending
the statutes.
By the time Congress passed Rule 412 many of these problems
already had begun to surface. Thus Congress was in a good position
to prevent the glaring weaknesses that threatened the state statutes
from crippling the federal statute. One major defect plaguing the
exclusionary statutes was the inability of the trial judge to exercise
any discretion in determining the relevancy of past sexual behavior
evidence. Congress addressed the problem in two ways. First, a spe-
cial provision was incorporated in Rule 412 that allows for the intro-
duction of past sexual behavior evidence if deemed constitutionally
required. Second, Congress choose to use a general "injury" excep-
tion for introducting past sexual behavior evidence offered by the
defendant to rebut evidence of physical consequences resulting from
the alleged rape. By including a general "injury" exception, Congress
avoided the danger of omitting a necessary exception. At the same
time, trial judges are not forced to decide these cases on constitutional
terms. The Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Shaw 228
essentially deletes these corrective measures from the statute. The
result: exclusion of highly probative evidence critical to allowing the
227. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
228. 824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1033 (1988).
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accused to properly defend himself, thereby violating his right to due
process of law.
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